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Abstract 
We study analysts’ industry recommendations. We find that the distribution of industry 
recommendations is quite balanced. Analysts show more optimism towards industries 
with high levels of R&D, past profitability and past returns. Industry recommendations 
possess investment value as portfolios based on these recommendations generate risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. Finally, industry recommendations contain information which 
is orthogonal to that included in firm recommendations, and more so for brokers who 
benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers. Consequently, the investment 
value of analysts’ recommendations is enhanced when both industry and firm 
recommendations are used.  
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1 Introduction 
Analysts’ industry knowledge is highly valued by investors. For example, Institutional 
Investor Magazine has been surveying institutional investors on the importance of various 
attributes in sell-side research analysts. For the period 1998-2008 industry knowledge was 
deemed the most important research attribute of equity analysts.1 Indeed, sell-side analysts are 
industry specialists. They are typically hired to and work in industry groups. Each group covers a 
set of firms that are similar to each other in their industry characteristics. Analysts then publish 
information both at the industry and firm levels. At the industry level, they write periodic 
industry reports, provide forecasts for the industry and offer industry recommendations. At the 
firm level, they analyze specific firms in their assigned industry, providing earnings estimates, 
recommendations, price targets, etc. The extant literature has explored analysts’ stock 
recommendations extensively.2 Despite their prominence, the literature has not studied industry 
recommendations, probably due to the lack of large scale data. In this paper we attempt to fill 
this gap.  
To motivate the analysis, consider the following example. During the second half of 
2007, the median stock recommendation issued for both GM and Chevron was a ‘hold.’ 
However, at that time, analysts issued bearish recommendations for the Automobiles industry as 
a whole, while they typically issued bullish recommendations for the Oil industry. This scenario 
raises several interesting questions.  
First, what are the industry attributes that determine industry coverage and the level of 
industry recommendations? In the example above, one might ask whether analysts favored the 
energy industry because it had shown high past returns, high profitability, or perhaps high equity 
issuance volume. Second, do recommendations for industries have any value to investors? After 
all, these recommendations are likely based on public and often stale information. Indeed, during 
the time period of the example above, it was common knowledge that oil prices were sky-
rocketing, benefiting the oil producers while hurting automobile manufacturers. Third, to the 
extent that industry recommendations do convey information, is this information incremental to 
                                                 
1 See: 
http://www.iimagazine.com/Rankings/RankingsEqtyTeamAmerica08.aspx?src=http://www.iimagazinerankings.com
/rankingsEqtyTeamAmerica08/whatInvestorsWant.asp . 
2 For a recent review of the literature see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008). 
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that already included in firm recommendations? In the example above, investors ought to know 
whether to interpret the ‘hold’ recommendation associated with GM and with Chevron 
identically or whether they should take into account the different industry recommendations. 
More generally, industry recommendations may just be aggregations of firm specific 
recommendations. Alternatively, they may include information that is orthogonal to firm 
recommendations – and thus can be used to enhance the performance of investment strategies 
based on firm recommendations. Finally, what can we learn about firm recommendations from 
comparing them with industry recommendations? In particular, do analysts benchmark their firm 
recommendations to the market or to industry peers? In the example above, when analysts issued 
a ‘hold’ recommendation to GM it is important to understand whether this signal was relative to 
the entire market or, instead, relative to peers such as Ford, Chrysler, and Toyota. 
To answer these questions we use the IBES database to collect industry 
recommendations. When an analyst produces a report with a recommendation on a firm’s stock, 
she often includes in the report her current outlook on that firm’s industry. In September 2002, 
IBES started recording the textual information on the industry outlook for those brokers 
reporting the industry recommendation in their firm reports. This information is recorded in the 
detailed stock recommendation file. Similar to firm recommendations, the text of industry 
recommendations is either optimistic (such as ‘overweight’), neutral (such as ‘equal weight’), or 
pessimistic (such as ‘underweight’).  
Since industry recommendations are attached in IBES to specific firms, we have to adopt 
a particular mapping between firms and the industries to which they belong. We follow Boni and 
Womack (2006) and Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003), and use the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), which is widely used by brokerage houses. This enables our research design to 
closely mirror the intentions of the broker when issuing the industry recommendation. 
We identify 33 financial institutions for which textual information on industry outlooks is 
available. Our sample includes a total of 41,315 industry recommendations in the period from 
September 2002 through December 2009. Overall, 32% of the industry recommendations are 
optimistic, 54% are neutral, and 14% are pessimistic. We study the factors associated with the 
level of optimism in industry recommendations. We find that past profitability, past returns, and 
the extent of R&D activity are positively associated with the probability of issuing an optimistic 
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industry recommendation. We do not find evidence that brokers are inclined to issue optimistic 
recommendations for industries in which they are active in providing equity underwriting 
services. This is in contrast to findings related to firm recommendations [e.g. Lin and McNichols 
(1998); Michaely and Womack (1999)]. 
We next turn to examine whether industry recommendations have value to investors. On 
one hand, analysts, being industry experts, are located in a junction of information related to the 
industry that they cover. They follow several companies in the industry, talk to their executives 
and other analysts, and are attentive to all relevant pieces of news. As such, they are good 
candidates to be the first to identify “hot” and “cold” industries. On the other hand, several 
reasons conspire to make it difficult for investors to earn abnormal returns based on industry 
recommendations. Some of the reasons relate to analysts’ role in collecting and using 
information. The literature has covered extensively how analysts’ expertise, special access, and 
relationships with the firm affect the way analysts perform.3 Because industry analysis uses 
widely available information, the only source of predictability can be a unique expertise in 
analyzing publicly available data. Another issue that may limit our ability to find any predictive 
power in industry recommendations is that they are likely to be quite stale when they become 
available on IBES. Brokers issue industry recommendations within industry reports that they 
publish on a monthly/quarterly basis. The industry recommendations that we observe are 
recorded only when a new stock recommendation is issued. Thus, we cannot identify the exact 
date in which the industry recommendation was originally issued. This and the fact that industry 
recommendations are issued infrequently suggest that any trading strategy relying on the industry 
recommendations published by IBES will be based on stale information.  
We study the investment value of industry recommendations by computing risk-adjusted 
returns of industry portfolios formed based on changes (upgrades/downgrades) in monthly 
consensus industry recommendations. 4  We find that a portfolio of industries about which 
                                                 
3 For example, the presence of an underwriting relationship enables a broker to issue better earnings forecasts 
[Malloy (2005)] or to be a better market maker [Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000); Madureira and Underwood 
(2008)], while the presence of a lending relationship affects the ability of a broker to secure future underwriting 
business [Drucker and Puri (2005); Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)], get better terms for new security 
offerings [Puri (1996)], or provide better earnings forecasts [Ergungor, Madureira, Nayar, and Sing (2008)]. 
4 Our main measure of risk-adjustment is the out-of-sample alpha obtained relative to the Fama-French four factors. 
This approach is similar to Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and 
Anshuman (2001). 
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analysts are most optimistic carries a significant out-of-sample alpha of 0.6% per month, while a 
pessimistic portfolio carries a significantly negative alpha of 0.9% per month. A hedged 
portfolio, long in the optimistic portfolio and short in the pessimistic portfolio, yields a positive 
and significant alpha of 1.4% per month.5 These are surprising results, especially considering the 
admittedly simple portfolio formation methodology. Buying, and even short-selling industry 
portfolios is simple and incurs low transaction costs using industry Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs). In addition, we find that while analysts do chase industry momentum [Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999)], the abnormal returns from industry recommendations is not driven by it.  
We then turn to studying the relation between industry and firm recommendations. In 
particular, we attempt to identify whether firm recommendations contain information regarding 
industry outlooks, or whether firm recommendations just rank firms within industries. Our first 
step is to examine brokers’ disclosures about how their recommendations should be interpreted. 
By examining these disclosures for the 20 largest brokers (in terms of numbers of 
recommendations), we find that 10 of these brokers, including six in our industry 
recommendation sample, benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers, while the 
other 10 rely on a market benchmark.  
Different benchmarks imply different ways by which firm recommendations reflect 
industry information. If brokers use an industry benchmark for their firm recommendations then 
their firm recommendations will contain no industry-wide information. Essentially such brokers 
limit their firm recommendations to ranking firms within industries. By contrast, if brokers use a 
market benchmark, then their firm recommendations are expected to incorporate industry 
outlooks. To help us distinguish between these alternatives we construct “pseudo industry 
consensus recommendations” – similar to those used in Boni and Womack (2006) – by value 
weighting all firm recommendations that belong to a specific GICS industry. Interestingly, we 
find that the correlation between the pseudo industry recommendations and the true industry 
recommendations is low (around 0.10-0.15), suggesting that the two are based on different 
information. We then repeat the abnormal return analysis using the pseudo industry 
recommendations. As expected, we find some evidence of abnormal returns for brokers who 
                                                 
5 We also compute the traditional in-sample alphas from simply estimating the Fama-French four factor model over 
the whole time series of excess returns on each portfolio. For all examinations in this paper, in-sample alphas are 
comparable – and even larger in terms of magnitude and significance – to the ones obtained with out-of-sample 
alphas. 
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benchmark their firm recommendation to the market – though these abnormal returns only apply 
to optimistic recommendations. By contrast, pseudo industry recommendations by brokers who 
benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers generate no abnormal returns. Hence, at 
least for analysts who benchmark firm recommendations to industry peers, it appears that true 
industry recommendations contain information regarding industry outlooks which is not already 
reflected in firm recommendations or in aggregations thereof. This extends the findings of Boni 
and Womack (2006). Furthermore, this result shows that industry recommendations contain 
information which is orthogonal to that included in firm recommendations, especially for brokers 
who benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers. 
Prior research demonstrates that firm recommendations carry investment value.6 If indeed 
firm recommendations are often aimed at ranking firms within industries, then conditioning firm 
recommendations on the prospects of the relevant industry should increase their investment 
value. Our final tests pursue this line of thought by combining the information in both industry 
and firm recommendations in forming monthly portfolios. At the industry level, we classify 
industries into three portfolios based on true industry recommendations as before. At the firm 
level, we follow Boni and Womack (2006) and classify firms into net upgraded and net 
downgraded firms. A firm can be allocated to one of six portfolios depending on its own 
recommendation (upgraded/downgraded) and on whether its industry carries an optimistic, 
neutral or pessimistic prospect.  
The results support the idea that industry and firm recommendations are complementary 
and that combining them adds investment value. For example, net upgraded stocks have 
abnormal returns only if they are part of industries with an optimistic or neutral outlook, but not 
when they are part of industries with pessimistic outlooks. In a similar fashion, net downgraded 
stocks have significantly negative alphas only when part of industries downgraded to a 
pessimistic outlook. In fact, when a downgraded firm belongs to an upgraded industry, it 
generates a positive abnormal return. Finally, we find that portfolios that are based on the 
combined signal of both industry and firm recommendations outperform portfolios based on just 
one of the two signals.  
                                                 
6  See for example Stickel (1995); Womack (1996); Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001, 2006); 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004); and Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2010). 
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Our paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. To our knowledge, this is 
the first paper to analyze industry recommendations, highlighting a new dimension of 
information provided by financial analysts. The ability to extract abnormal returns from a simple 
trading strategy based on industry recommendations shows the relevance of these 
recommendations from an investment perspective and reinforces the findings of Institutional 
Investor Magazine. The paper also sheds new light on the information contained in firm 
recommendations. Different brokers define their firm recommendations based on different 
benchmarks – either the market or industry peers. We establish that industry recommendations 
contain information that is orthogonal to that included in firm recommendations. In fact, firm 
recommendations are best interpreted in conjunction with industry recommendations, jointly 
yielding higher investment value.  
The paper is related to Boni and Womack (2006), who were the first to analyze the role 
of analysts as industry experts. They show that the value in firm recommendations comes mostly 
from ranking firms within industries. Boni and Womack (2006) did not have access to industry 
recommendations, and instead analyzed aggregations of firm recommendations. They conclude 
that such aggregations cannot be used as signals for industry prospects. Having access to 
industry recommendation data, we are able to study the importance of industry expertise directly. 
We establish that industry recommendations contain information which is orthogonal to that 
included in firm recommendations or in their aggregations. Furthermore, we revisit the issue of 
the informativeness of aggregations of firm recommendations. We show that the different 
benchmarks used by analysts for their firm recommendations are important in interpreting such 
aggregations. The paper also complements Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), who show that 
analysts help facilitate the incorporation of industry information into prices.  
Our paper also relates to the literature exploring the relative importance of industry 
selection in the investment process. Busse and Tong (2008) report that the industry selection 
component of a typical actively managed mutual fund accounts for about half of that fund’s risk-
adjusted return. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) show that funds that concentrate holdings 
in fewer industries – the ones in which they have some informational advantages – tend to 
outperform the more diversified funds. Avramov and Wermers (2006) show that optimally-
chosen portfolios based on predictable variation in mutual funds’ characteristics outperform their 
benchmarks, and one important source of this outperformance is the portfolios’ strategic 
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allocation to specific industries over the business cycle. Our results add to this literature by 
directly showing that industry specialists are capable of providing useful industry outlooks.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the data. In Section 3 
we explore the characteristics of industry recommendations. In Section 4 we study the 
investment value of firm recommendations. Section 5 discusses the relation between industry 
and firm recommendations. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Data 
2.1 Brokers and Industry Recommendations 
Starting in September of 2002 IBES began to record industry recommendations made by 
analysts alongside firm recommendations.7 This information is recorded in the ‘btext’ (more 
lately ‘etext’) field in the IBES recommendation file. This field always contains the text of the 
firm recommendation (e.g. ‘buy’, ‘hold’, ‘underperform’). For investment banks which include 
an industry recommendation in their firm reports, the field also records the industry 
recommendations. See Appendix for details. 
In the period starting in September 2002 through December 2009, 33 brokers have 
provided at least one industry recommendation.8 Table 1 lists those brokers along with some 
information regarding their coverage. As listed, the six largest brokers in our sample in terms of 
the number of industry recommendations made available on IBES are Goldman Sachs, Credit 
Suisse, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros. (replaced by Barclays in 2008) and CIBC. 
For these brokers, we find that industry recommendations are attached to firm recommendations 
over 95% of the time. It is important to note that other large investment banks also issue industry 
recommendations. However, these banks do not include their industry recommendations in firm 
reports, and hence their industry recommendations are not recorded by IBES. In general, 16.6% 
                                                 
7 The IBES files we used were downloaded in 2008 and 2009. These are free from the data problems identified in 
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009). These problems are related to IBES files from 2002-2004. Note that IBES 
files starting from 2009 do not include recommendations from Lehman Bros (before they were converted to 
Barclays). We obtain these recommendations from the 2008 files.  
8 In line with Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) we omit from the sample recommendations re-issued 
during the change in rating systems during 2002. Similarly, we omit recommendations originally issued by Lehman 
Bros, and then re-issued by Barclays when taking over Lehman’s research department during 2008. That is, we only 
account for these recommendations once, when they were initially issued. 
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of all recommendations in IBES during our sample period carry with them an industry 
recommendation.  
                                          <Insert Table 1 here> 
2.2 Industry Classification 
IBES reports the industry recommendation issued by a broker for the industry to which a 
firm belongs. However, IBES does not explicitly report the industry to which the firm belongs, 
as defined by the broker. We infer this industry from the identity of the firm and its industry 
classification as defined by the General Industry Classification Standard (GICS) obtained from 
Compustat. This classification is maintained by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI Barra, and is 
widely adopted by investment banks as an industry classification system (as opposed to the SIC 
classification that is popular among academics). The GICS system has four classification levels: 
10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries, and 154 sub-industries.9 These classifications are 
highly intuitive, and have been shown to better explain stock comovements compared to other 
popular industry classifications [Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003)]. In the context of this research, 
Boni and Womack (2006) show that the GICS classification is a good proxy for how sell-side 
analysts specialize by industry.10  
                                          <Insert Table 2 here> 
Similar to Boni and Womack (2006) and Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003), we focus on the 
industry level (6 digits). Table 2 presents the complete list of industries using the GICS 
classification, as well as some basic statistics of industry coverage by the brokers in our 
sample.11 By casually examining industry classifications in the relevant investment banks, we 
find our classification to be broadly as fine as or finer than the one used by them. This ensures 
that our industry classification captures variations in industry recommendations within each 
broker.  
                                                 
9 Standard and Poors and MSCI Barra change their GICS industry definitions from time to time. The numbers listed 
here are as of August 2008, and have not changed since then. 
10 We extend the analysis offered in Boni and Womack (2006), by comparing the analyst coverage choice in our 
sample relative to different industry classifications: besides GICS, we also look at SIC (2 digits), IBES internal 
classification and the Fama-French 48 industries. The comparison (available upon request) shows that the GICS 
partition most closely resembles how brokers define their industries. 
11 Notice that two of the GICS industries have been discontinued. This is the reason why Table 1 shows 70 
industries with industry recommendations for Brokers 1020 and 1595, while the number of GICS industries as of 
August 2008 is only 68. 
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According to Boni and Womack (2006), the percentage of all companies an analyst 
covers that are in one GICS industry averages 81% for analysts at the 20 largest brokerages (for 
our sample of brokers with industry recommendations, the statistics for the period 2002-2009 is 
78%). This suggests that by relying on the GICS classification we are misclassifying industries 
relative to the true classification used by the broker about 22% of the time.12 Note that such 
errors add noise to our measures, and thus work against finding any evidence of return 
predictability based on industry recommendations. In section 4.1 we construct industry 
consensus recommendations in a way that mitigates some of this inevitable noise.  
 
2.3 Industry Recommendations 
Similar to firm recommendations, brokerage houses use a variety of terms to express 
optimism, neutrality, or pessimism toward industries. In the case of firm recommendations, IBES 
transforms the textual recommendation into a five-point rating system (recorded in the IRECCD 
item). By contrast, the text of industry recommendation is not recorded numerically. Hence, we 
convert the text using a key presented in Appendix I. We code recommendations with an 
optimistic tone as ‘1’, recommendations with a neutral tone as ‘2’, and recommendations with a 
pessimistic tone as ‘3’. Thus, for each IBES entry that also includes the textual description of the 
industry outlook, we have both the recommendation for the firm itself (optimistic, neutral, or 
pessimistic) and the recommendation for the industry to which the firm belongs (again, 
optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic).  
3 Basic Characteristics of Industry Recommendations 
Table 3 presents summary statistics to describe coverage and distributional properties of 
industry recommendations for the largest six brokers in our sample. 13  Panel A shows that 
                                                 
12 In fact, these numbers serve as an upper bound on the error, since in many cases analysts still use the GICS 
classification method, but occasionally focus on the industry-group or sector level, rather than the industry level. For 
example, an analyst can cover all firms in the ‘Utilities’ industry, while the GICS industry level distinguishes 
between ‘Gas’ and ‘Electric Utilities’. Our method of constructing portfolios (see Section 4.1) is robust to such 
cases.  Real errors can occur only when broker uses a classification system that is different from GICS.  
 
13 The table actually includes seven brokers. However, Broker 2108 (Lehman Bros.) was replaced during 2008 by 
Broker 10902 (Barclays). Also, Brokers 251 (Bear Stearns) and 846 (Credit Suisse) do not have any 
recommendations in 2009.  
10 
 
coverage is quite comprehensive across the universe of industries for five out of the six brokers 
during 2002-2009.14 Note that the number of GICS industries (bottom row) has increased from 
55 to 68 over the years, which seems to explain the increasing trend in coverage across brokers. 
We have specifically examined the industries which are not covered by each of the largest 
brokers during the sample period. Relatively neglected industries are Water Utilities and 
Tobacco. Thus, it appears that unlike in stock recommendations, there is no real decision 
whether to initiate or drop coverage of an industry (at least for the large brokers that consistently 
provide industry recommendations). Rather, pretty much all the large brokers cover almost all 
industries. This suggests that in contrast to firm recommendations, selection bias [McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997)] is not a major issue with industry recommendations.  
                                          <Insert Table 3 here> 
Panel B presents the distribution of industry recommendations by year for all brokers in 
our sample. The table shows that the frequency of optimistic recommendations hovers around 
30%, with little variation over the years. There is, however, a modest increase in the frequency of 
neutral recommendations accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of pessimistic 
recommendations. Panel C presents the average industry recommendations by broker for the six 
largest brokers during our sample period. The results show that there is little difference between 
the different brokers, as average recommendations hover somewhat below ‘2’ (neutral to slightly 
optimistic) for all of them. These results suggest that brokers issue a pretty balanced distribution 
of industry recommendations, with just a small inclination toward optimism. In Section 5 we 
compare this distribution to that of the associated firm recommendations.  
To better understand the determinants of industry recommendations we examine the 
probability of issuing an optimistic/pessimistic recommendation as a function of several factors. 
The main explanatory variables we investigate are industry size (aggregate market-value of all 
firms in the industry in the month before the recommendation), lagged industry and market 
returns, and industry value-weighted averages of market-to-book ratio, profitability (return on 
assets), R&D (as a fraction of assets), and capital expenditures (as a fraction of assets).15 All 
accounting variables are measured during the year prior to the issuance of the recommendation. 
                                                 
14 During the year 2002 coverage is lower because our sample period only starts in September of that year. In 2008 
we see a decline in industry coverage of CIBC and Credit Suisse (broker codes 1750 and 846). 
15 Equal weighting of these variables does not change any of the conclusions. 
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Additionally, it may be that analysts are more optimistic about industries that have a high 
IPO/SEO activity in an attempt to win underwriting business. To examine whether such conflicts 
of interest have an effect on industry recommendations we include three variables related to 
equity underwriting activity.  The first two are the total and average IPO/SEO proceeds in the 
industry during the year preceding the recommendation. These variables capture the volume of 
equity issuance in the industry. The last variable is the percentage of IPO/SEO proceeds in an 
industry underwritten by the issuing broker during the two years preceding the recommendation, 
out of all IPO/SEO proceeds underwritten by this broker during that time period. This variable is 
close in spirit to the “affiliation” variable used in prior research to proxy for conflicts of interest 
at the firm level [Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999)]. We also control for 
broker fixed effects to account for any broker-specific time invariant characteristics. We cluster 
the standard errors at the broker-industry level. 
Table 4 presents the results of logit models based on the explanatory variables above. We 
use two specifications. In the first (second) specification the dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one when the industry recommendation is optimistic (pessimistic) and zero otherwise.16 
Consider the first specification. The probability of issuing an optimistic recommendation is 
increasing in the average profitability and R&D intensity in the industry, and decreasing in the 
market-to-book ratio. For example, for the median industry, a one standard deviation increase in 
R&D intensity increases the probability of issuing an optimistic recommendation by 5.5 
percentage points.17   We also observe a momentum effect as the probability of issuing an 
optimistic recommendation is increasing in the industry returns during the two quarters 
preceding the recommendation. We do not observe any tendency of brokers to issue an 
optimistic recommendation to industries in which they are active as underwriters or in industries 
in which there is more underwriting activity in general.  
                                          <Insert Table 4 here> 
                                                 
16 Note that the two specifications are not mutually independent. They reflect the same set of results viewed from 
two different angles. It would have been desirable to pool the two separate logistic models into a single ordered-logit 
model. However, this is not possible, since the Wald test rejects the parallel regression assumption, implying that an 
ordered-logit (and similarly an ordered-probit) is not valid in this case. See Long and Freese (2006: p. 197-200) for 
details. 
17 For the median firm, the marginal effect of R&D (from Table 4) is 1.27, and the standard deviation of R&D is 
0.0433 (not tabulated).  
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Similar to the optimistic model, the pessimistic model shows that high R&D activity is 
less likely to be associated with a pessimistic industry recommendation. Like the optimistic 
model, we observe a strong momentum effect. Furthermore, underwriting activity does not seem 
to affect the probability of issuing a pessimistic recommendation. Different from the optimistic 
model, we see that industry size has a significant effect. Analysts are somewhat reluctant to issue 
pessimistic recommendations to large industries. 
We also conducted but did not tabulate an alternative analysis in which we use the 
average industry recommendation across brokers within a given month as a dependent variable. 
This dependent variable is left censored at 1 and right censored at 3. To account for that, we 
estimate a Tobit model.  In this case, IPOSEO_PCT is not defined since we aggregate the 
recommendations issued by different brokers.  The conclusions from this model are similar.  
 
4 Investment Value of Industry Recommendations 
There is an extensive literature showing that analysts add value with their firm 
recommendations [see for example Stickel (1995); Womack (1996); Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, 
and Trueman (2001, 2006); Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004); and Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (2010)]. A natural question concerning industry recommendations is whether they also 
have value from an investment perspective.  
On one hand, analysts are industry experts. They are located in a cross-road of 
information related to the industry that they cover. As such, they may be able to be the first to 
identify “hot” and “cold” industries, and their industry recommendations may reflect that. On the 
other hand, some prominent features of industry recommendations make their investment value 
less obvious. First, industry recommendations are likely based on a synthesis of macroeconomic 
data and aggregated firm specific data. Generating such recommendations requires skill and 
experience, but it is likely that they are based on information that is available to all. Second, 
industry recommendations are issued infrequently. Typically, analysts update their industry 
reports on a monthly or quarterly basis. Moreover, unlike with firm recommendations, our data 
does not allow us to identify the exact date in which the industry recommendation is issued. 
Rather, we can only identify whether a brokerage-house changed its industry recommendation 
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within a month. Thus, any trading strategy relying on industry recommendations will necessarily 
involve trading based on stale information.  
The analysis in this section explores whether industry recommendations have investment 
value. We analyze the returns of portfolios constructed based on the signals conveyed by these 
recommendations. That is, we ask whether an investor would have obtained abnormal returns, 
had she followed up on the recommendations by investing in these portfolios. This is the 
common approach used to test for information in firm recommendations [e.g., Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman (2001, 2006), Boni and Womack (2006), and Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (2010)].18 
 
4.1 Recommendation Portfolios  
We first aggregate the recommendations to create monthly consensus industry 
recommendations. To avoid neglected industries, facilitate aggregation of information across 
brokers, and to mitigate some of the noise associated with GICS misclassification (see Section 
2.2) we compute the consensus of industries for which we have at least three recommendations 
during a month. In Appendix II we provide a formal discussion of how this approach diminishes 
the noise associated with the industry classification error. We compute the monthly consensus by 
averaging all the industry recommendations issued during that month by all the brokers in our 
sample. To illustrate, assume that brokers issued 10 recommendations for firms in the Media 
industry in month t, then the consensus recommendation for the Media industry would be the 
average of the industry recommendations recorded from the ‘btext’ field in those 10 
recommendations. This approach allows us to capture changes in industry recommendations 
during a month. For example, if a broker changed her recommendation for the Media industry 
from ‘1’ to ‘2’ during the month, then the consensus for month t will be affected by this change.  
Next, in each month t we refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as 
“optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal to 1.5. We refer to the consensus 
recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we refer 
                                                 
18 Another common approach involves looking at investors’ short-term reactions to newly issued recommendations. 
However, since this approach depends on knowing the exact recommendations’ issuance day, it cannot be applied 
here. 
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to the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios for each month t. 
Portfolio 1 in month t consists of all industries that were upgraded to “optimistic” during month 
t-1, Portfolio 3 consists of all industries that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, 
and Portfolio 2 consists of all industries that were either upgraded or downgraded into the 
“neutral” consensus during month t-1.19 This approach of building investment portfolios based 
on changes (revisions) in recommendations is consistent with literature on stock 
recommendations [e.g. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004); Barber, Lehavy, McNichols 
and Trueman (2006); Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2010)]. 
                                          <Insert Table 5 here> 
Panel A of Table 5 presents summary statistics related to the three portfolios and the 
portfolio formation procedure. First, note that Portfolios 1 and 2 are well defined in all 87 
months of our sample period. By contrast, Portfolio 3 (the downgrade to pessimistic portfolio) is 
only defined in 65 months. Thus, there are 22 months in which there aren’t any industries whose 
consensus was downgraded to “pessimistic.” The average number of industries belonging to 
Portfolios 1 through 3 in a given month is 5.5, 10.4, and 2.8, respectively.  
Note that an alternative approach would be to assign industries to portfolios based on a 
certain percentile (such as deciles) of the consensus. This approach is common in the momentum 
and over-reaction literature. However, the literature on analysts has typically avoided this type of 
arbitrary sorting, which ignores the literal meaning of the recommendations. For example, Panel 
A of Table 5 shows that if we were to always allocate the lowest decile of changes in consensus 
recommendations into a pessimistic portfolio we would occasionally treat industries as having a 
negative outlook despite the fact that analysts assign these industries a neutral outlook. An 
investment strategy based on such an arbitrary sort would miss the correct interpretation of the 
analysts’ recommendation.   
Panel A of Table 5 reveals that the different industries are quite evenly distributed among 
the three portfolios. Over our sample period 65 out of the 68 industries belonged to Portfolio 1 at 
some point. Portfolio 3 is the least represented, but still around two thirds of the industries 
                                                 
19  In unreported results, we also examine breaking down Portfolio 2, depending on whether an industry was 
upgraded or downgraded towards “neutral.” None of the conclusions presented in the paper changes under this 
different breakdown.  
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belonged to this portfolio at some point. This suggests that the classification to the three 
portfolios is not degenerate, and can potentially contain information.  
 
4.2 Raw Returns 
Using CRSP data we calculate a monthly return for each one of the three portfolios in 
two steps. First, we calculate a month t industry return for each one of the GICS industries. This 
is the value-weighted return across all CRSP firms in the relevant industry, where the weights are 
based on market values at the end of month t-1.20,21 Second, we calculate the monthly return for 
portfolios 1-3 as the equal weighted return of all industries in the relevant portfolio. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports raw monthly returns related to different time periods for each 
one of the three portfolios. To interpret the results, recall that portfolios in month t are formed 
based on consensus industry recommendations in month t-1. Consider first the average returns in 
month t-1. They are monotonically decreasing as we move from Portfolio 1 (1.3%) to Portfolio 3 
(-0.2%, insignificant). A similar trend is observed in month t-2. Consistent with the logit results, 
these trends suggest that analysts chase industry momentum. Consider now the returns in month 
t. These reflect the returns to portfolios constructed based on the industry recommendations 
issued in the previous month. The monthly return on Portfolio 1 is 1.3% which is significantly 
different from Portfolio 3’s return of 0.1%. Moreover, a hedged portfolio long in Portfolio 1 and 
short in Portfolio 3, during the 65 months in which Portfolio 3 exists, yields a significant 1.4% 
per month. When examining the returns of the different portfolios starting from month t+1, we 
do not find a significant difference between the three portfolios, except in the case of 12 months 
returns. However, the 12-months result is not robust. In a previous version of the paper with data 
ending in 2007, these cumulative returns are not significant. These preliminary examinations 
suggest that if there is any kind of predictive power in industry recommendations, it is likely 
concentrated in a relatively short time horizon of one month.  
                                                 
20 The most obvious and least costly way to “buy” or “sell” an industry is to buy or sell the appropriate industry 
ETF. By calculating the industry return as a weighted average of all CRSP firms in this industry we essentially 
replicate the return on the corresponding industry ETF. 
21 If a firm is delisted at time t, its monthly return plus its delisting return from CRSP are used in the computation of 
its industry return. If a firm has a missing return at time t, we exclude it from the computation of the industry return. 
In a robustness test we replace missing returns of a firm in month t with the market return during that month; results 
are not sensitive to this change.  
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4.3 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
We next turn to evaluating whether portfolios based on industry recommendations can 
generate abnormal returns. We estimate out-of-sample alphas of the three industry portfolios 
relative to the Fama-French four factors (excess market return, HML, SMB, and UMD). Our 
approach is similar to Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001). For each month t in our sample period, we regress the 
monthly excess returns of the three industry portfolios on the returns of the Fama-French four 
factors during the preceding 60 months: t–60 to t–1. Thus, for each month t in our sample period 
we obtain an estimate of the four-factor loadings as of that month. Denote these factor loadings 
by , ,MKT p t ,  , ,SMB p t , , ,HML p t , and , ,UMD p t , where, for example, , ,MKT p t stands for the loading on 
the market factor related to month t and portfolio p (where p=1,2,3 is one of the three industry 
portfolios).  
Now, for each month t we calculate the out-of-sample four-factor alpha of portfolio p 
(denoted ,p tAlpha ) as the realized excess return of the portfolio less the expected excess return 
calculated from the realized returns on the factors and the estimated factor loadings: 
ttpUMDttpHML
ttpSMBttMKTtpMKTttptp
UMDHML
SMBRfRETRfRETAlpha
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where ,p tRET , ,MKT tRET , and tRf  are the realized returns on industry portfolio p, the CRSP 
value-weighted index, and the risk-free rate, respectively, during month t; and RETMKT,t-Rft, 
SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the appropriate realized returns on the factor portfolios in month t. 
For each of the three portfolios we thus obtain a time series of 87 (65 for p=3) out-of-
sample alpha estimates as well as a time series of factor loadings. Panel A of Table 6 reports the 
averages of these estimates. The average out-of-sample alpha of portfolio 1 is 0.59% per month 
(7.1% per year), significant at the 1% level. Portfolio 2 does not show an abnormal return. By 
contrast, portfolio 3 generates a negative alpha of 0.9% per month. Finally, a hedged portfolio 
long in portfolio 1 and short in portfolio 3 yields a significant average out-of-sample alpha of 
1.4% per month. To annualize this number note that the hedged portfolio can only be held about 
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9 months in each year because portfolio 3 only exists about 75% of the time. Hence an estimate 
of the annualized abnormal return of the hedged portfolio is 1.4%*9=12.6% (assuming that 
whenever portfolio 3 does not exist, the investment strategy has zero alpha).22  
                                          <Insert Table 6 here> 
For completeness and to facilitate comparison with other studies we also conducted an in-
sample analysis in which we regress the excess return of the different portfolios on the four 
Fama-French factors as in Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Truman (2001, 2006). The intercept 
from this regression is an estimate of the in-sample alpha. The results from this analysis are 
reported in Panel B of Table 6. They are comparable (and even larger) in magnitude and 
statistical significance to the out-of-sample results. For example, the in-sample alpha of the 
hedged portfolio is a significant 1.5% per month (13.5% annually based on nine trading months 
in a year).23 
Table 6 also reports the factor loadings of the portfolios. It is interesting to note that the 
hedged portfolio has no market exposure in both the in-sample and out-of-sample analyses. Both 
the in-sample and out-of-sample results show that the hedged portfolio loads negatively on the 
HML factor and positively on the UMD factor – with the loadings on the individual industry 
portfolios showing that this is mostly due to pessimistic industries relying more on growth and 
less on momentum. 
For robustness we performed the same analysis relaxing the requirement of at least three 
recommendations for an industry to calculate the monthly consensus. The average out-of-sample 
alpha of the hedged portfolio when requiring just two recommendations is 1.3% (significant at 
1%), and when imposing no requirements at all it is 0.7% (significant at 6%). These results are 
still both statistically and economically significant, but they are smaller in magnitude. This is 
consistent with our expectation that removing the requirement is likely to increase the frequency 
of industry misclassifications, and thereby weaken the informativeness of the industry consensus. 
                                                 
22 In practice trading in industries can be done using industry/or sector ETFs. The trading costs associated with such 
instruments are very low. The bid-ask spreads are about 0.05%, the annual management fees are around 0.5%, and 
the price impact is negligible. Overall, our calculations suggest that transaction costs knock-off around 1% of value 
per year, which is less than 10% of the alpha of these trading strategies. 
23 In-sample alphas are also computed for the examinations in the next sections, and they confirm and even magnify 
the results obtained with out-of-sample alphas. For brevity, we do not report these in-sample alphas. They are 
available upon request. 
18 
 
One might also wonder whether the results are attributed exclusively to a “bull” or a 
“bear” market. Note that our time period covers both, and in particular it includes the recent 
global financial crisis as well as the “bull” market that preceded it. As a robustness check, we 
test whether the results of Table 6 are reversed during the bear market of 2008. Of course, any 
such analysis is suggestive only, as it is based on just 12 monthly observations. We find that the 
average alpha for these 12 months is insignificant, which is what one would expect given the 
lack of power. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the alpha for 2008 is different than 
the alpha during the rest of our sample period. Thus, it appears that the results are not reversed 
during the bear market of 2008.  
As an additional robustness test we checked the return predictability of industry 
recommendations using the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional approach. For each month in our 
sample we estimated a cross-sectional regression with industry excess returns as a dependent 
variable, and industry characteristics as independent variables. The characteristics we used are: 
beta, size, book-to-market, momentum, and the industry-consensus portfolio to which the 
industry belongs. We then average the coefficients over time and use a t-test to examine their 
statistical significance. The results (not reported) show that the industry portfolio has a strong 
correlation with excess monthly returns, confirming our previous conclusions.  
The predictive value of industry recommendations may seem surprising, particularly 
given that our portfolios are formed based on industry recommendations that are potentially 
stale. Indeed, the portfolios are formed only at the end of each month. It is important to note, 
however, that much of the predictability that we indentify comes from short selling a small group 
of industries that are in Portfolio 3 (see Panel A of Table 5). The difference between the 
abnormal returns in Portfolios 1 and 2 (which together account for more than 90% of the 
industries) is not statistically significant.  
As we have noted before, analysts chase industry momentum in their industry 
recommendations. Industry momentum is also known to generate abnormal returns [Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999)]. Thus, it is interesting to ask whether the abnormal returns related to 
industry recommendations are attributed to industry momentum. To answer this question we 
constructed industry momentum portfolios and compared their returns to the industry 
recommendations portfolios. The results of this analysis (unreported for brevity) indicate that 
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there is no significant industry momentum in our sample. Furthermore, the abnormal returns 
related to industry recommendations are significantly higher (both statistically and economically) 
than those related to industry momentum.24   
 
5 Relation between Industry and Firm Recommendations 
Typically, the same analysts in investment banks issue both industry and firm 
recommendations. In this section we explore to what extent the two types of recommendations 
are related, whether they reflect distinct pieces of information, and whether they can be jointly 
used to enhance the investment value of analysts’ recommendations. 
5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
It seems reasonable that industry and firm recommendations are at least somewhat 
related. For example, an analyst can employ a top-down approach under which she collects and 
analyzes macroeconomic data, demand and supply information for the industry, etc. This 
analysis influences her understanding of the prospects of each firm in the industry. From a 
bottom-up perspective, an analyst can study many firms in the industry and then extract common 
aspects that help her understand the prospects of the industry as a whole. Both approaches 
suggest that the outlooks expressed at the industry and firm levels should be related. On the other 
hand, relatedness does not imply perfect alignment between recommendations at the industry and 
firm levels. In fact, one can view a firm’s prospects as driven by two components, one linked to 
its industry’s overall prospects and the other associated with the firm’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics – allowing, for example, for existence of winners and losers in the same industry. 
Therefore, we expect the outlooks expressed at the industry and firm levels to be related, but 
only to a certain degree. 
                                          <Insert Table 7 here> 
                                                 
24 A remarkable aspect of our results is that analysts are able to provide abnormal returns by choosing assets among 
a very small set of candidates, even as each such asset is unlikely to provide abnormal performance on its own. 
According to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), there is little evidence “that unconditional abnormal industry returns 
exist per se,” and we confirm in our sample that less than 10% of the individual GICS carry significant out-of-
sample alphas over our sample period.  
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Table 7 provides a preliminary look at the interaction between industry and firm 
recommendations. As with industry recommendations, we map firm recommendations into 3 
levels, coding recommendations with an optimistic tone (“strong buy” or “buy”) as ‘1’, 
recommendations with a neutral tone (“hold”) as ‘2’, and recommendations with a pessimistic 
tone (“sell” or “strong sell”) as ‘3’. 25  The table reveals a significant variation in firm 
recommendations within each level of industry recommendation. For example, out of the firm 
recommendations issued with an optimistic industry recommendation, 42% are rated optimistic, 
45% are rated neutral, and 13% are rated pessimistic. We also see a wide dispersion of firm 
recommendations issued with neutral and pessimistic industry recommendation. The average 
firm recommendation for firms in industries rated as optimistic is 1.71, in industries rated neutral 
is 1.81, and in industries rated pessimistic is 1.96 – and the differences between these numbers 
are significant. This suggests that there is some positive correlation between industry and firm 
recommendations. However, the dispersion in firm recommendations for a given level of 
industry recommendation suggests that industry and firm recommendations contain different 
types of information.  
Panel B of Table 7 provides a different perspective on the relation between firm and 
industry recommendations, by showing the distribution of industry recommendations within firm 
recommendation levels. First, note that the distribution of recommendations at the firm level is 
also quite balanced, with 35% optimistic, 50% neutral, and 15% pessimistic recommendation. 
This distribution is consistent with prior results regarding the period following the Global 
Settlement [Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006); Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and 
Zach (2009)]. Similar to Panel A, we observe a considerable variation in industry 
recommendations within each level of firm recommendation. Again, this suggests that industry 
and firm recommendations may convey different information. 
5.2 The Benchmark for Firm Recommendations 
To better understand the relation between firm and industry recommendations, it is 
necessary to know whether firm recommendations reflect information about the industry. That is, 
does a ‘buy’ recommendation issued to a firm reflect a buying opportunity relative to the entire 
                                                 
25 Given that our sample period starts in September 2002, most of the brokers follow a 3-tier rating scheme for their 
firms recommendations. See Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009). 
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market, or relative to industry peers? If analysts benchmark their firm recommendations to 
industry peers then these recommendations must be interpreted in the context of their industry. 
For example, a ‘hold’ recommendation issued to GM (see Introduction) relative to the 
Automobiles industry peers has a completely different investment implication than a ‘hold’ 
recommendation relative to the market as a whole.  
If firm recommendations are benchmarked to industry peers then firm and industry 
recommendations should contain orthogonal information. While industry recommendations 
forecast the outlook for the industry as a whole, firm recommendations forecast the deviations of 
specific firms from the industry outlook. In this case, industry recommendations have 
independent value to investors. Furthermore, firm specific recommendations should not be 
interpreted outside of their industry context. Hence, combining industry and firm 
recommendations would add value to investors. 
If, on the other hand, firm recommendations are benchmarked to the market, then they 
incorporate both systematic industry information as well as firm-specific information. Hence, we 
expect industry recommendations to reflect an aggregation of firm recommendations. In this 
case, industry recommendations are just a repackaging of multiple firm recommendations, and 
they do not carry incremental value to investors beyond firm recommendations. Under this 
scenario, firm recommendations could be interpreted independently from industry 
recommendations, and combining them would not add value to investors. 
5.2.1 Analysis of Brokers’ Disclosures 
In order to understand how firm recommendations are benchmarked, we start by 
examining the disclosures of analysts regarding the meaning they assign to their firm 
recommendations. Under regulations NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, which were 
adopted prior to the beginning of our sample period, analysts are required to disclose the 
meaning of their recommendations inside their reports. We examined these disclosures for the 20 
largest brokers (in terms of numbers of recommendations). Table 8 summarizes our findings. Out 
of the 20 brokers, 10 brokers state that they benchmark their firm recommendations to industry 
peers including the six largest brokers in our industry recommendations sample. We refer to 
these brokers as “industry benchmarkers.” For example, in the case of CIBC, analysts rate 
individual stocks based on the “stock’s expected performance vs. the sector.” In contrast, the 
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other 10 brokers state that they benchmark their recommendations to the entire market or to a 
specific threshold return. We refer to such brokers as “market benchmarkers.” For example, 
Wachovia’s analysts rate a stock based on the stock’s expected performance “relative to the 
market over the next 12 months.” Thus, the disclosures in Table 8 suggest that brokers differ, 
according to their statements, in their interpretation of firm recommendations. 
                               
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
5.2.2 Pseudo Industry Recommendations 
The fact that brokers state that they use a specific benchmark is anecdotal only. We next 
examine empirically which benchmark is in fact being used. As explained above, if brokers use 
an industry benchmark for their firm recommendations then their firm recommendations will 
contain no industry-wide information. By contrast, if brokers use a market benchmark, then their 
firm recommendations will have information regarding industry outlook.  This observation 
enables us to construct a simple test as follows. In each month t we construct a “pseudo industry 
consensus recommendation” by value weighting all recommendations issued during that month 
to firms belonging to the specific GICS industry.26 That is, the pseudo industry recommendations 
mirror the “true” industry recommendations studied in the paper. Only that, instead of obtaining 
them directly from IBES, we construct them by aggregating firm recommendations on an 
industry level [similar to Boni and Womack (2006)]. 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
Panel A of Table 9 presents summary statistics of the pseudo industry recommendations. 
First, the panel shows that the average pseudo industry recommendation for all brokers is 1.62. 
By comparison, the average real industry recommendation is somewhat less optimistic at 1.85. 
We then distinguish between two sets of brokers based on the analysis in Table 8. The average 
pseudo industry recommendation for industry benchmarkers is 1.71, while the average for 
                                                 
26  We also tried a version of the pseudo industry recommendations based on equal weighting of the firm 
recommendations. The results are similar. 
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market benchmarkers is a bit more optimistic at 1.62. Overall, there does not seem to be a large 
economic difference between the two sub-groups in the level of their recommendations. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents the correlation matrix between the different types of pseudo 
industry recommendations and the true industry recommendations. There is little correlation 
between the pseudo industry recommendations and the true industry recommendations. These 
correlations range from 0.10 to 0.15, suggesting that true industry recommendations are very 
different in their informational content than just an aggregation of firm recommendations. For 
the industry benchmarkers the correlation is 0.14. Such a low correlation is expected given these 
brokers’ claims that their firm recommendations are benchmarked to industry peers – and thus 
are not expected to contain much industry information. The more surprising result is that the 
correlation between the true and pseudo industry recommendations among the market 
benchmarkers is still just 0.10. Here we would expect pseudo industry recommendations to 
contain information about the industry, and thus be more correlated with industry outlooks. 
However, we find little such evidence. This raises the possibility that while market benchmarkers 
state that they use a market benchmark for their firm recommendations, in practice they may still 
benchmark to industry peers.27 
To more formally investigate this issue we repeat the out-of-sample analysis from Table 
6 using the pseudo industry recommendations. Boni and Womack (2006) conduct a similar 
analysis.28 The idea is that if pseudo industry recommendations possess predictive information 
regarding the industry, then portfolios based on pseudo industry recommendations will 
demonstrate abnormal returns. In particular, this analysis enables us to compare the performance 
of investment strategies based on true industry recommendations with those based on pseudo 
industry recommendations.  
Panel C of Table 9 presents the results. As in Table 6, in each month we sort industries by 
their consensus pseudo industry recommendation and construct three portfolios related to high 
                                                 
27 Note that the “true” industry recommendations in this case are typically not issued by the market benchmarkers. 
Therefore, another alternative, of course, is that market benchmarkers have strikingly different views about industry 
prospects when compared to the views expressed in the explicit industry recommendations by the brokers in our 
sample. 
28 The focus of our paper is on true industry recommendations, which is different from Boni and Womack (2006) 
who did not have access to such recommendations. Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) conduct an analysis somewhat 
similar to that of Boni and Womack (2006), but they focus on excess returns relative to the market rather than risk-
adjusted abnormal returns.  
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(Portfolio 1), medium (Portfolio 2), and low (Portfolio 3) consensus levels. Then, we calculate 
the out-of-sample alphas of the three portfolios and of a portfolio that is long in Portfolio 1 and 
short in Portfolio 3. Consider first Column (1), which presents the results for all brokers. It 
shows that the alphas are not different from zero for the three portfolios as well as for the long-
short portfolio. This is consistent with the findings of Boni and Womack (2006, page 106). 
Similar results obtain in Columns (2), which refers to the industry benchmarkers. By contrast, in 
Column (3) we find that optimistic pseudo industry recommendations of market-benchmarkers 
generate a significant out-of-sample alpha of 0.37%. This is consistent with the disclosure of 
these brokers, and suggests that firm recommendations contain some industry information among 
those brokers. However, this conclusion does not carry through to the pessimistic portfolio or the 
hedged portfolio as their alphas are insignificant.  
Our conclusion from this analysis is twofold. First, the results show that true industry 
recommendations are different from just an aggregation of firm recommendations. While the 
former contains valuable information to investors regarding industry outlooks, the latter does not 
seem to have investment value in general, and only modest investment value among market 
benchmarkers. This is in line with the low correlation between the real- and pseudo-industry 
recommendations, documented in Panel B. Secondly, the results show that among the market 
benchmarkers, where we do expect pseudo industry recommendations to have investment value, 
we  find little predictive power (only with respect to optimistic industries). One possible 
explanation for the limited predictive power is that analysts work in industry teams and their 
main expertise is specialized within an industry. It is thus likely easier for analysts to rank firms 
within their own industry, rather than ranking firms relative to the market.   
5.3 The Investment Value of Combining Industry and Firm Recommendations 
The results so far suggest that true industry recommendations have investment value that 
is unrelated to information in firm recommendations. Prior research demonstrates that firm 
recommendations also have investment value. Jointly, these two observations suggest that 
combining firm and industry recommendations will enhance their investment value. In this 
section we explore this idea.  
Our trading strategy consists of first choosing industries using industry recommendations. 
Then, one can use firm recommendations to choose firms within the selected industries. The 
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combined strategy extracts the full power of analysts’ knowledge as it incorporates their signals 
both within and across industries. For example, we can form portfolios that are long in firms with 
optimistic recommendations that belong to industries with optimistic recommendations, and 
short in firms with pessimistic recommendations in industries with pessimistic recommendations. 
As a start, we follow Boni and Womack (2006) in constructing portfolios based on 
upgrades and downgrades in firm recommendations. For each firm covered by IBES and each 
month during our sample period, we count the number of upgrades and downgrades that the firm 
received. An upgrade or downgrade is defined at a firm-broker level. For example, an upgrade on 
firm i by broker B in month t means that B issued a recommendation for i in month t that was 
more optimistic than the most recent recommendation issued by B to i. (Therefore we ignore 
reiterations of recommendations, or initiations of coverage.) We then compute the difference 
between the number of upgrades and the number of downgrades for each month and firm across 
all brokers. If the difference is positive, then the firm is a “net upgrade.”  Conversely, if the 
difference is negative, then the firm is a “net downgrade.”  In each month t we form two 
portfolios based on firm recommendations, one for the net upgraded firms in month t-1 (Portfolio 
U) and one for net downgraded firms in month t-1 (Portfolio D). Returns on each portfolio are 
obtained from equal-weighting the returns on their stocks.29 
                                          <Insert Table 10 here> 
We next combine firm and industry recommendations. In each month we perform a 
double-sort of the universe of firms based on the firm classification (whether “net upgraded” or 
“net downgraded”) and on its industry classification (belonging to either of the three industry 
portfolios described in the previous section). This generates six portfolios of firms whose out-of-
sample four-factor alphas are reported in Table 10. For example, the top left entry represents 
firms that belong to the industries in Portfolio 1 and are “net upgrades” individually, while the 
bottom right entry represents firms that belong to industries in Portfolio 3 and are “net 
downgrades” individually.  
                                                 
29 Notice that a third “portfolio” is implied here, the one with firms that were neither “net upgraded” nor “net 
downgraded.” In fact, about half of the firms receiving recommendations in the month would be in this third 
“portfolio”, either because they only receive reiteration/ initiations of recommendations, or because the number of 
upgrades is equal to the number of downgrades.  
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The results support the idea that combining industry and firm recommendations enhances 
investment value.  For example, whether “net upgraded” firms show abnormal returns depends 
on their industry outlook: such net upgraded stocks have significantly positive alphas if they are 
part of the industries with optimistic outlook (1,U) or neutral outlook (2,U), but not when they 
are part of the industries with the worst outlook (3,U). In a similar fashion, “net downgraded” 
stocks have significantly negative alphas when part of a pessimistic industry (3,D), but not when 
they are part of an optimistic industry (1,D) or a neutral industry (2,D). In fact, when a firm is a 
“net downgrade” but belongs to an industry in Portfolio 1, it generates positive abnormal returns 
of 1.5% per month. A trading strategy long in the top-left portfolio (1,U) and short in the bottom-
right portfolio (3,D) yields a monthly out-of-sample alpha of 3.3%. This alpha is larger than the 
one obtained in Table 6 using industry recommendations only.  
Overall, the results in this section suggest that industry recommendations contain 
information that is not already incorporated in firm recommendations. While firm 
recommendations often focus on ranking stocks within industries, industry recommendations 
enable investors to rank industries. Thus, combining the two types of recommendations generates 
investment portfolios that outperform portfolios based on just one type of recommendation (firm 
or industry).  
 
6 Conclusion 
Using new data that became available on IBES in 2002, we study analysts’ industry 
recommendations. This is a major output of analysts’ research that has not been explored so far.  
Analysts provide such recommendations on a monthly/quarterly basis, and, for a subsample of 
the IBES brokers, such recommendations are reported in the firm recommendations file.  
Institutional investors assign a high level of importance to analysts’ industry expertise – 
as reflected in the Institutional Investor Magazine survey cited in the Introduction. Our results 
suggest that analysts do indeed possess an ability to analyze industries as reflected in the 
investment value of their industry recommendations. Furthermore, the results highlight the 
importance of this new facet of analysts’ research. As we show, not only do industry 
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recommendations have investment value, but also they incorporate information that is distinct 
from that conveyed by firm recommendations.  
Another important element of our study is that the analysis of industry recommendations 
enables us to better understand the meaning of firm recommendations. Analysts differ in their 
disclosures regarding the benchmark for their firm recommendations. Our empirical findings 
suggest that these differences are only partly reflected in the information contained in firm 
recommendations.  
Being the first paper to study industry recommendations, several interesting questions 
remain. First, what is the source of investment value in industry recommendations? In particular, 
is there a link between industry recommendations and the subsequent investment decisions of 
either retail or institutional investors? Second, given the importance of industry knowledge, what 
is its role in analysts’ compensation and reputation? Third, what are the relative weights that 
should be assigned to industry vs. firm recommendations to maximize their investment value? 
Finally, what can be learned from the fact that some brokers use an industry benchmark while 
others use a market benchmark for their firm recommendation? These are questions to be 
addressed in future research. 
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Appendix I 
To illustrate how IBES records industry recommendations we present a specific example. 
In January 2006, Bear Stearns published an analyst report on Apple (AAPL). We obtained this 
report from the Investext Plus database. The front page of the report shows that the analyst 
issued an ‘outperform’ recommendation for Apple. Additionally, the front page cites a ‘market 
weight’ recommendation for the IT hardware industry. This recommendation is taken from a 
periodic industry report prepared by a group of analysts at Bear Stearns.  
IBES recorded these recommendations as follows: 
Ticker RECDATS BROKER BTEXT/ETEXT IRECCD 
AAPL 20060112 BEAR OUTPERFORM/MKTWT 2 
Note that the ‘btext’ item includes two words separated by a ‘slash’. The text before the 
slash is the firm recommendation, whereas the text after the slash is the industry 
recommendation. Industry recommendations only appear in this item for brokers that include 
them in the front page of their firm reports.  
Below, we present how we assign numeric values to the text depicting industry 
recommendations. We code optimistic industry recommendations as ‘1’, neutral industry 
recommendations as ‘2’, and pessimistic industry recommendations as ‘3’.  
Optimistic (1) Neutral (2) Pessimistic (3) 
ACCUMULATE CORE HOLD AVOID 
ABOVE AVERAGE IN-LINE CAUTIOUS 
ACC MARKET PERFORM NEGATIVE 
ACCUM MARKETPERFORMER REDUCE 
ACCUMULATE MARKETPERFRM SELL 
ADD MKTWT UNDERPERF. 
ATTRACTIVE MP UNDERPERFORM 
BUY NEUTRAL UNDERWT 
OUTPERFORM   
OVERWT   
POSITIVE   
STRONGBUY   
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Appendix II 
As we discussed in Section 2.2, when we draw a recommendation, the GICS industry to 
which we are associating that recommendation is incorrect roughly 22% of the time. This is a 
result of the fact that not all brokers use the GICS classification system.  In this Appendix we 
illustrate the implications of these incorrect classifications, and explain how increasing the 
number of required recommendations reduces the noise associated with this problem. For this 
exercise assume that the unconditional distribution of industry recommendations comes from the 
statistics in Table 3, that is: 31% optimistic, 55% neutral, and 14% pessimistic.  
Consider the probability of drawing an optimistic signal for industry j based on a single 
recommendation. This will occur when the single recommendation assigned to the industry j, 
Recj, equals 1, or: 
Pr(Indj=Optimistic)=Pr(Recj=1) 
Since recommendations can be incorrectly mapped to industries, we need to distinguish between 
the recommendation as we map it using GICS, and the “true recommendation,” which is the 
recommendation assigned to the industry given the issuing broker’s classification system. In the 
example above, one could have observed an optimistic recommendation for industry j even when 
its true recommendation was neutral or pessimistic. We can then write, 
Pr(Recj=1)   = Pr(Recj =1 | TrueRecj =1)*Pr(TrueRecj=1)+ 
Pr(Recj =1 | TrueRecj =2)*Pr(TrueRecj=2)+  
Pr(Recj =1 | TrueRecj =3)*Pr(TrueRecj=3)         (1) 
If the GICS mapping were used by all brokers, then the last two terms would vanish, as 
the probability that we observe an optimistic recommendation when the true recommendation is 
not optimistic is zero, and we would trivially derive Pr(Recj =1|TrueRecj=1)=100%. That is, we 
would be left with Pr(Recj=1)=Pr(TrueRecj=1). Under the possibility of incorrect mappings, 
though, we need to rely on all these conditional probabilities to estimate the mapping error.  
Let’s explore the first such probability. If the true recommendation is ‘1,’ then the 
probability of observing a recommendation of ‘1’ is based on whether the GICS mapping 
matches the broker’s mapping. If the mapping is correct (which happens 78% of the time), the 
reading is ‘1’ with 100% certainty. If the mapping is incorrect (which happens 22% of the time), 
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then the probability of drawing a recommendation of ‘1’ can be approximated by the 
unconditional probability of having a recommendation of ‘1,’ that is, 31%.30 Let MappingOk 
denote the event that the GICS mapping is correct, and we can write: 
Pr(Recj=1|TrueRecj=1)= Pr({Recj =1|TrueRecj=1}| MappingOk=1)*Pr(MappingOk=1)+ 
                                        Pr({Recj =1|TrueRecj=1}| MappingOk=0)*Pr(MappingOk=0)= 
                  1*0.78+0.31*0.22=0.8482, 
which means that, conditional on the analyst being optimistic about this particular GICS 
industry, only 84.82% of the readings will indicate optimism. Similarly, we obtain that 
Pr(Recj=1|TrueRecj=2) =Pr(Recj=1|TrueRecj=3)=0.0682 – that is, even when the true 
recommendation level is neutral or pessimistic, we still draw an optimistic level for the industry 
6.82% of the time.  
In sum, one sees optimistic industries 31% of the time, but only 26.29%  (Pr(Recj =1 | 
TrueRecj =1)*Pr(TrueRecj=1)=0.8482*0.31) are true optimistic ones. The remaining, 3.75% and 
0.96%, refer to industries that had, respectively, a truly neutral or pessimistic prospect but were 
incorrectly tagged as optimistic due to errors in GICS mappings. This amounts to 
4.71%/31%=15.2% of the optimistic readings from single recommendations being incorrect. As 
for the industries tagged with a pessimistic tone, which happens 14% of the time, 2.65%, or 
2.65%/14%=18.92% of them, are incorrectly set as pessimistic.  
By increasing the number of required recommendations we can reduce these mapping 
errors with respect to optimistic and pessimistic readings. The idea is that if these errors are 
approximately independent (which would be the case in a large enough sample) then the 
probability of assigning the wrong recommendation level to an industry decreases with the 
number of sampled recommendations. The calculations when allowing for the cases in which we 
require at least two or three recommendations for an industry to be included in the portfolios are 
                                                 
30 We are assuming a large enough sample, so that we can consider drawing recommendations with replacement.  
Still the assumption that the distribution of recommendations when the mapping is incorrect is the same as the 
unconditional distribution of recommendations is a simplification.  Given that an analyst tends to track companies 
that are similar to each other, returns on these tracked firms, as well as returns on their industries, will tend to be 
correlated. Thus, even when a recommendation is assigned to a different GICS than the one the analyst had in mind 
when publishing the recommendation, it is likely that the two industries are related, and thus their recommendations 
will be correlated as well.  This suggests, for example, that Pr({Recj =1|TrueRecj=1}|MappingOk=0) can be higher 
than 31%. An examination of these conditional probabilities that adjusts for this additional correlation reveals, 
though, that the inferences here are not much affected. 
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quite straightforward generalizations of those shown above (and are available upon request). 
Misclassifications still abound when industry signals are based on a combination of two 
recommendations. For example, 20.32% of industries classified as optimistic based on two 
recommendations are done so incorrectly. On the other hand, these misclassifications are almost 
completely eliminated when a 3-recommendations threshold is used; In this case, only 2.65% 
(1.40%) of optimistic (pessimistic) classifications are incorrect.  
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics on Brokerage Houses 
This table presents summary statistics on the brokerage houses whose industry recommendations are available in 
IBES during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009). We report IBES Broker Code (BMASKCD), the number of 
firms receiving recommendations from the brokerage house, the number of firm recommendations issued by each 
brokerage house, the average of such firm recommendations, the number of industries with available industry 
recommendations of each brokerage house, and the total number of industry recommendations issued by each 
brokerage house and available in IBES. When calculating the average firm recommendation, we assign firm 
recommendations a numeric value as follows: “strong buy” and “buy”=1, “hold”=2, “underperform” and “sell”=3.  
Industries are classified by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).   
  
Broker 
Code 
# of firms 
covered 
Total # of firm 
recommendations 
Avg. firm 
recommendation 
# of industries 
with industry 
recommendations 
Total # of industry 
recommendations 
1020 1904 10163 1.89  70 9985 
1595 1799 7118 1.88  70 7116 
846 2145 9039 1.73  68 6678 
251 1567 5396 1.75  66 5366 
2108 1754 5291 1.76  65 5250 
1750 1304 3756 1.81  57 3751 
10902 1072 1885 1.70  63 1831 
2475 324 984 1.52  37 373 
1284 231 857 1.24  17 360 
3668 468 1162 1.59  19 256 
480 21 118 1.82  13 69 
7230 85 140 1.60  18 54 
5197 29 48 1.42  9 46 
415 299 805 1.80  11 35 
5439 101 336 1.43  15 29 
11946 44 67 1.46  6 19 
11553 36 50 1.64  5 16 
19573 11 15 1.20  6 15 
5183 15 37 2.68  2 13 
2233 8 9 2.33  1 9 
12368 33 106 1.24  3 9 
4817 16 36 1.39  3 8 
4474 185 455 1.51  4 5 
4451 1074 2668 1.66  4 4 
7163 18 19 1.21  3 4 
4865 3 8 1.38  2 3 
813 6 12 1.67  2 2 
1534 2829 12183 1.75  1 2 
2225 10 11 1.00  2 2 
3927 2 3 1.33  1 2 
28 183 356 1.44  1 1 
4234 128 382 1.35  1 1 
5253 381 1206 1.48  1 1 
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
This table presents summary statistics on each industry defined by GICS during our sample period (9/2002 – 
12/2009).  For each GICS, the table shows its corresponding industry name, the number of firms in the industry, the 
average market capitalization (in $M) and the average market-to-book ratio across firms in the industry, the number 
of brokerage houses (out of the 33 brokers in Table 1) that issue recommendations to this industry at any point 
during our sample period, the average number of brokerage houses which issue recommendations to this industry 
per month, the average number of recommendations issued to this industry per month, and the average level of these 
monthly industry recommendations. The number of firms in each industry is based on the number of firms in CRSP 
in 2009. The market capitalization and the market-to-book ratio are calculated based on 2009 and 2008 data, 
respectively.  We assign industry recommendations a numeric value as follows: “optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, 
“pessimistic”=3. The monthly industry recommendation is calculated as the average industry recommendation 
issued to the industry within the month. 
 
GICS Industry_Name 
# of 
firms 
Avg. 
market 
cap 
Avg. 
M/B 
# of 
brokers 
covering 
Avg. # of 
brokers 
issuing 
rec. per 
month 
Avg. # 
of rec. 
per 
month 
Avg. 
monthly 
industry 
rec. 
101010 Energy Equipment & Services 81 3754.50  0.59  11 3.20  13.27  1.28  
101020 Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels 292 5610.73  2.83  14 5.35  34.25  1.74  
151010 Chemicals 89 3797.70  0.74  10 2.42  7.34  1.62  
151020 Construction Materials 12 1602.13  0.49  4 0.35  0.52  1.78  
151030 Containers & Packaging 22 1987.11  0.42  7 1.22  3.09  1.77  
151040 Metals & Mining 138 3567.25  0.95  12 3.51  10.23  1.62  
151050 Paper & Forest Products 18 1895.72  0.30  7 1.48  3.34  2.07  
201010 Aerospace & Defense 68 4618.84  0.75  10 2.17  5.80  1.71  
201020 Building Products 24 857.01  0.58  8 0.60  0.77  1.75  
201030 Construction & Engineering 32 1428.12  0.69  11 0.99  2.13  1.68  
201040 Electrical Equipment 99 1156.36  1.00  13 1.63  3.81  1.58  
201050 Industrial Conglomerates 17 15565.78 0.61  7 1.08  1.73  1.65  
201060 Machinery 121 2230.40  0.71  10 2.68  7.16  1.77  
201070 Trading Companies & Distributors 30 934.12  0.60  8 1.06  1.55  1.80  
202010 Commercial Services & Supplies 94 1062.96  0.80  13 3.13  9.45  1.78  
202020 Professional Services 55 767.29  0.91  5 0.18  0.30  1.84  
203010 Air Freight & Logistics 15 5904.04  1.20  6 1.11  2.50  1.71  
203020 Airlines 22 1688.54  0.28  6 1.90  6.09  1.86  
203030 Marine 27 410.35  0.30  6 0.55  0.91  2.09  
203040 Road & Rail 36 4717.64  0.69  7 1.74  5.52  1.98  
203050 Transportation Infrastructure 9 466.42  0.39  4 0.30  0.52  1.80  
251010 Auto Components 40 1368.98  0.43  8 1.61  4.56  2.30  
251020 Automobiles 8 12861.95 0.26  7 1.02  1.52  2.34  
252010 Household Durables 73 1180.24  0.35  8 1.78  4.83  1.95  
252020 Leisure Equipment & Products 26 727.91  0.50  10 0.74  1.06  1.76  
252030 Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods 62 1343.44  0.75  9 1.32  3.26  2.02  
253010 Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 125 1913.11  0.60  14 4.01  15.27  1.84  
253020 Diversified Consumer Services 41 1282.99  1.96  9 1.19  1.80  1.78  
254010 Media 139 3011.21  0.37  11 4.45  18.97  1.96  
255010 Distributors 11 860.56  0.42  5 0.26  0.26  2.14  
255020 Internet & Catalog Retail 26 3493.56  1.38  11 1.80  3.22  1.63  
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Table 2 – Cont.  
 
GICS Industry_Name 
# of 
firms 
Avg. 
market 
cap 
Avg. 
M/B 
# of 
brokers 
covering 
Avg. # of 
brokers 
issuing 
rec. per 
month 
Avg. # 
of rec. 
per 
month 
Avg. 
monthly 
industry 
rec. 
255030 Multiline Retail 17 5822.64  0.55  10 1.85  4.06  2.17  
255040 Specialty Retail 121 2406.32  0.56  13 4.30  16.95  2.11  
301010 Food & Staples Retailing 34 10888.92 0.71  8 1.88  4.28  1.87  
302010 Beverages 35 8449.57  0.62  6 1.55  3.58  1.85  
302020 Food Products 77 3724.15  0.79  7 2.01  5.15  2.15  
302030 Tobacco 9 18444.96 4.35  5 0.52  1.14  1.63  
303010 Household Products 13 20228.34 0.74  7 1.01  1.72  1.95  
303020 Personal Products 34 1348.47  1.32  8 1.06  1.63  1.85  
351010 Health Care Equipment & Supplies 154 2277.76  1.32  16 3.33  8.93  1.53  
351020 Health Care Providers & Services 124 2323.75  0.87  12 4.07  18.17  1.69  
351030 Health Care Technology 25 964.09  1.48  9 0.40  0.61  1.68  
352010 Biotechnology 178 1296.45  2.46  14 3.99  11.67  1.54  
352020 Pharmaceuticals 104 7546.38  1.60  12 3.44  9.69  1.59  
352030 Life Sciences Tools & Services 57 1426.58  1.40  7 0.69  1.67  1.63  
401010 Commercial Banks 399 1583.53  0.08  10 2.75  11.35  2.02  
401020 Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 157 333.11  0.10  9 1.43  3.60  1.99  
402010 Diversified Financial Services 39 11373.25 0.83  10 2.25  5.59  1.99  
402020 Consumer Finance 23 3889.49  0.30  10 1.09  1.88  2.02  
402030 Capital Markets 105 4541.15  0.66  10 2.45  8.18  1.87  
403010 Insurance 142 4260.35  0.30  10 3.59  15.38  1.88  
404010 
Real Estate -- Discontinued effective 
04/28/2006    6 1.68  8.53  2.33  
404020 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 148 1974.60  0.38  6 1.28  7.16  2.28  
404030 Real Estate Management & Development 35 1013.77  0.43  6 0.34  0.47  2.13  
451010 Internet Software & Services 101 2688.59  1.10  12 3.20  7.61  1.56  
451020 IT Services 90 2946.92  0.76  10 2.84  8.11  1.75  
451030 Software 168 3677.52  1.31  16 4.32  15.73  1.70  
452010 Communications Equipment 121 2993.19  0.72  14 3.82  11.91  1.77  
452020 Computers & Peripherals 61 10149.39 0.81  14 2.97  8.28  1.81  
452030 
Electronic Equipment, Instruments & 
Components 144 966.18  0.73  10 3.02  7.58  1.82  
452040 Office Electronics 3 3917.73  0.62  6 0.25  0.28  1.84  
452050 
Semiconductor Equipment & Products -- Discontinued effective 
04/30/2003. 11 0.59  5.84  1.76  
453010 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 150 2559.40  0.80  12 4.13  21.14  1.73  
501010 Diversified Telecommunication Services 70 5223.70  0.37  11 3.45  10.45  1.90  
501020 Wireless Telecommunication Services 32 4739.27  0.46  13 2.89  7.03  1.88  
551010 Electric Utilities 42 5802.72  0.35  7 2.45  8.99  2.28  
551020 Gas Utilities 28 1890.83  0.51  7 1.06  2.34  2.06  
551030 Multi-Utilities 27 5976.77  0.32  9 1.52  3.88  2.25  
551040 Water Utilities 16 678.80  0.67  4 0.19  0.20  2.15  
551050 
Independent Power Producers & Energy 
Traders 14 2864.53  0.29  8 0.72  1.15  2.08  
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Table 3 – Coverage and Distribution of Industry Recommendations 
This table presents coverage information for the GICS industries. Panel A shows the number of such industries 
covered by each of the sample’s seven largest brokers for which we have industry recommendations. An industry is 
considered to be covered by a broker in a specific year if there is at least one industry recommendation being issued 
for that industry by the broker. Panel B reports the distribution of the industry recommendations levels over the 
years for all brokers. We assign industry recommendations a numeric value as follows: “optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, 
“pessimistic”=3. Panel C shows the average industry recommendation for each broker and each year of our sample. 
 
Panel A – Industry Coverage by Broker and by Year for the Seven Largest Brokers 
 
BMASKCD 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1020 51 54 53 57 65 66 66 64 
1595 49 59 55 56 61 61 61 57 
846 53 57 57 58 61 64 29 0 
251 48 54 49 53 57 56 45 0 
2108 44 56 53 56 60 58 42 0 
1750 43 43 40 40 41 41 12 4 
10902 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 60 
Number of GICS 
Industries 59 62 62 64 67 67 68 68 
 
Panel B – Distribution of Industry Recommendations by Year for All Brokers in Sample 
 
Industry 
Recommendation 
(%) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 Overall 
1 33.92  31.62  33.33 32.27 31.26 28.58 28.50  35.22 31.71 
2 52.17  51.01  52.59 52.84 54.97 59.09 59.70  55.72 54.53 
3 13.90  17.37  14.08 14.89 13.77 12.34 11.80  9.06 13.76 
 
Panel C – Average Industry Recommendations by Broker and Year for the Seven Largest Brokers 
 
BMASKCD 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Overall 
1020 1.89  1.94  1.93  2.02  1.87  1.89  1.91  1.75  1.88  
1595 1.95  2.02  1.90  1.99  1.88  1.77  1.84  1.71  1.88  
846 1.78  1.91  1.79  1.71  1.88  1.86  1.79  0.00  1.83  
251 1.66  1.93  1.78  1.91  1.84  1.96  1.90  0.00  1.85  
2108 1.85  1.75  1.78  1.67  1.72  1.70  1.82  0.00  1.74  
1750 1.75  1.72  1.71  1.77  1.74  1.78  1.65  1.64  1.74  
10902 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.73  1.74  1.73  
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Table 4 – Determinants of Industry Recommendations  
This table reports the results of estimating logistic models of the probabilities of issuing an optimistic or pessimistic 
industry recommendation. The models are estimated for all industry recommendations issued during our sample 
period (9/2002-12/2009). The independent variables are as follows: Industry_Size is the natural logarithm of the 
aggregate market capitalization of the industry, MB is the industry weighted average of the market-to-book ratio, 
Profit is the industry weighted average of net income margin, R&D is the industry weighted average of the R&D 
divided by sales, Capex is the industry weighted average of the capital expenditures divided by sales. Firm 
characteristics are measured at the beginning of the year. All weighted averages are by the firm market-
capitalization at the beginning of the year in which a recommendation is issued. IND_RET is the return to an 
industry index in the previous quarters (up to three quarters back). MKT_RET is the market return in the previous 
quarters (up to three quarters back). TOTAL_IPOSEO is the total IPO/SEO proceeds in the industry during the 
year preceding the recommendation. AVG_IPOSEO is the average IPO/SEO proceeds in the industry during the 
year preceding the recommendation. IPOSEO_PCT is the percentage of IPO/SEO proceeds in an industry 
underwritten by the issuing broker during the two years preceding the recommendation, out of all IPO/SEO proceeds 
underwritten by the same broker during that time period. In both specifications we control for broker fixed-
effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated after clustering at the broker-industry level.  ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table appears in the next page.  
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Table 4 – Cont. 
 
  Prob(Ind Rec=Optimistic) Prob(Ind Rec=Pessimistic) 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects at 
Medians 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects at 
Medians
Industry_ Size 0.0307 0.0072  -0.194 -0.0027  
 (0.464)   (2.007)**  
MB -0.0033 -0.0008  0.0016 0.0000  
 (2.356)**   (1.292)  
Profit 1.133 0.2663  -1.5403 -0.0218  
 (1.787)*   (1.746)*  
R&D 5.3914 1.2673  -12.832 -0.1817  
 (3.299)***   (5.613)***  
Capex 0.6954 0.1635  -3.38 -0.0479  
 (0.352)   (1.251)  
IND_RETt-1 1.6169 0.3801  -1.8285 -0.0259  
 (2.621)***   (2.856)***  
IND_RETt-2 1.746 0.4104  -1.1824 -0.0167  
 (4.029)***   (2.046)**  
IND_RETt-3 0.6538 0.1537  -1.8438 -0.0261  
 (1.582)   (2.562)**  
MKT_RETt-1 0.0418 0.0098  -0.1103 -0.0016  
 (0.078)   (0.220)  
MKT_RETt-2 0.0344 0.0081  -0.7294 -0.0103  
 (0.091)   (1.115)  
MKT_RETt-3 -0.8956 -0.2105  0.0641 0.0009  
 (2.047)**   (0.096)  
TOTAL_IPOSEO -0.0037 -0.0009  0.1135 0.0016  
 (0.055)   (1.245)  
AVG_IPOSEO -0.0633 -0.0149  -0.1311 -0.0019  
 (0.673)   (0.962)  
IPOSEO_PCT 0.976 0.2294  -1.2434 -0.0176  
 (0.452)   (0.499)  
Observations 30818   30433   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Table 5 – Summary Statistics on the Industry Recommendation Portfolios 
This table reports summary statistics on the industry recommendation portfolios during our sample period (9/2002-
12/2009). Our industry portfolios are constructed for each month based on consensus recommendations. A 
consensus recommendation is defined as the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we 
refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as “optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We 
refer to the consensus recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we 
refer to the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios for each month. Portfolio 1 in month 
t consists of all industries that were upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio 3 consists of all industries 
that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio 2 consists of all industries that were either 
upgraded or downgraded into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1. Panel A describes basic characteristics 
about the portfolio formation: the number of months each portfolio is defined over; the average monthly consensus 
recommendation for all the industries that are part of the portfolio; the average number of industries included in each 
portfolio per month; the average number of firms (across all industries) in each portfolio; and the total number of 
different industries which ever enter into the portfolio. Panel B shows various portfolio returns. Industry return is 
defined as the value-weighted return across all CRSP firms in the relevant month. The monthly return for portfolios 
1-3 is the equal weighted return of all industries in the relevant portfolio. “Rec Port 1 minus Rec Port 3” is the self 
financing investment strategy of buying the industry recommendation portfolio 1 and shorting the industry 
recommendation portfolio 3.  
 
Panel A – Portfolio Formation Characteristics 
Industry 
Recommendation 
Portfolio # of 
Months 
Ave. Monthly 
Consensus  
Rec. 
Ave. # of 
Industries 
per month 
Ave. # of 
Firms  
# of 
industries 
1 87 1.29 5.51 667.55 65 
2 87 1.92 10.42 1077.11 68 
3 65 2.77 2.83 294.98 47 
 
Panel B – Industry Recommendation Portfolio Returns 
  Raw Monthly Return  
Cumulative 
Returns  
Industry 
Recommendation 
Portfolio t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
3 months    
(t, t+2) 
6 months     
(t,t+5) 
12 months   
(t,t+11) 
1 0.0115 0.0133 0.0132 0.009 0.0036 0.0262  0.0578  0.0930  
p-value 0.0488 0.035 0.0182 0.116 0.5787 0.0339  0.0018  0.0007  
         
2 0.0067 0.0068 0.0121 0.0095 0.0096 0.0313  0.0643  0.0916  
p-value 0.2477 0.2405 0.0243 0.1006 0.0785 0.0042  0.0005  0.0008  
         
3 0.0058 -0.002 0.0009 0.01 0.0112 0.0237  0.0533  0.0604  
p-value 0.5108 0.8176 0.9223 0.1671 0.182 0.1765  0.0504  0.0830  
         
Rec Port 1 minus Rec Port 3 0.0024 0.0130 0.0136 -0.002 -0.006 0.0065 0.0171 0.0442 
p-value 0.7063 0.0491 0.0175 0.6543 0.2757 0.4843 0.2078 0.0222 
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Table 6 - In-Sample/Out-of-Sample Tests of Industry Recommendation Portfolios 
This table reports the out-of-sample regression results (Panel A) and the in-sample regression results (Panel B) of 
the industry recommendation portfolios during our sample period (9/2002-12/2009). The in-sample/out-of-sample 
tests are performed on each portfolio return in month t by using Fama-French four-factor model. Our industry 
portfolios are constructed for each month based on the consensus recommendations. A consensus recommendation 
is defined as the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we refer to the consensus 
recommendation for an industry as “optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We refer to the consensus 
recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we refer to the consensus as 
“neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios for each month. Portfolio 1 in month t consists of all industries 
that were upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio 3 consists of all industries that were downgraded to 
“pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio 2 consists of all industries that were either upgraded or downgraded 
into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1. Industry return is defined as the value-weighted return across all 
CRSP firms in the relevant month. The monthly return for portfolios 1-3 is the equal weighted return of all 
industries in the relevant portfolio. “Rec Port 1 minus Rec Port 3” is the self financing investment strategy of buying 
the industry recommendation portfolio 1 and shorting the industry recommendation portfolio 3.  
 
 
Panel A – Out-of-Sample Tests on Industry Recommendation Portfolios  
Industry Recommendation 
Portfolio 
Out-of-Sample 
Alpha Ret_mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD 
1 0.0059 1.0370 0.1319 0.0330 -0.0340 
p-value 0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 0.3810 0.0671 
      
2 0.0014 1.0020 0.1509 0.1270 -0.0710 
p-value 0.4048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
3 -0.0090 0.9757 0.1494 0.4400 -0.1310 
p-value 0.0453 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
Rec Port 1 minus Rec Port 3 0.0138 0.0567 -0.0100 -0.4040 0.1035 
p-value 0.0029 0.1535 0.8032 0.0000 0.0010 
 
 
Panel B – In-Sample Tests on Industry Recommendation Portfolios  
Industry Recommendation 
Portfolio 
In-Sample 
Alpha Ret_mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD 
1 0.0054 1.0614 0.1316 -0.1195 0.0707 
p-value 0.0206 0.0000 0.2039 0.1954 0.1197 
      
2 0.0041 0.9586 0.1147 -0.0754 -0.0686 
p-value 0.0195 0.0000 0.1356 0.2695 0.0427 
      
3 -0.0110 1.1434 0.3086 0.4155 -0.1908 
p-value 0.0060 0.0000 0.0922 0.0090 0.0116 
       
Rec Port 1 minus Rec Port 3 0.0147 0.0308 -0.1491 -0.5498 0.2887 
p-value 0.0032 0.8377 0.5044 0.0052 0.0022 
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Table 7 - Distribution of Industry Recommendations and Firm Recommendations 
This table reports the frequency of industry recommendations and firm recommendations issued by the brokers 
identified in Table 1 during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009). Industry recommendations are coded as follows: 
“optimistic”=1, “neutral”=2, “pessimistic”=3. Firm recommendations are coded as follows: “strong buy” and 
“buy”=1, “hold”=2, “underperform” and “sell”=3. Panel A reports the distribution of firm recommendations within 
each level of industry recommendation, while Panel B reports the distribution of industry recommendations within 
each level of firm recommendation.  
  
Panel A - Distribution of Firm Recommendations Within Industry Recommendation Levels 
Industry Recommendation Firm Recommendation Frequencies
% of total 
(Unconditional) 
% of industry 
(Conditional) 
1 1 5456 13.33% 42.04% 
1 2 5844 14.28% 45.03% 
1 3 1678 4.10% 12.93% 
Ave. (1) 1.71   31.71% 100.00% 
     
2 1 7485 18.29% 33.54% 
2 2 11532 28.18% 51.68% 
2 3 3298 8.06% 14.78% 
Ave. (2) 1.81   54.53% 100.00% 
     
3 1 1487 3.63% 26.41% 
3 2 2879 7.04% 51.14% 
3 3 1264 3.09% 22.45% 
Ave. (3) 1.96   13.76% 100.00% 
p-values     
Ave (1) = Ave (2) <.0001    
Ave (2) = Ave (3) <.0001     
 
Panel B - Distribution of Industry Recommendations Within Firm Recommendation Levels 
Firm Recommendation Industry Recommendation 
 
Frequencies 
% of total 
(Unconditional) 
% of Firm 
(Conditional) 
1 1 5456 13.33% 37.82% 
1 2 7485 18.29% 51.88% 
1 3 1487 3.63% 10.31% 
Ave. (1) 1.72   35.26% 100.00% 
     
2 1 5844 14.28% 28.85% 
2 2 11532 28.18% 56.93% 
2 3 2879 7.04% 14.21% 
Ave. (2) 1.85   49.50% 100.00% 
     
3 1 1678 4.10% 26.89% 
3 2 3298 8.06% 52.85% 
3 3 1264 3.09% 20.26% 
Ave. (3) 1.93   15.25% 100.00% 
p-values     
Ave (1) = Ave (2) <.0001    
Ave (2) = Ave (3) <.0001     
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Table 8 – Analysts’ disclosure about the meaning of firm recommendations 
This table reports information regarding the nature of firm recommendations, as it is disclosed by the brokerage 
houses. We include the 20 largest brokers in terms of the number of recommendations they issued during our sample 
period (9/2002-12/2009). In addition to the brokerage name and the percentage of recommendations, we indicate 
whether the recommendations are benchmarked to the industry. We also include an example of the original remark 
about the adopted benchmark by the brokerage house.  
 
# 
Brokerage 
House 
% of 
recs.  
Benchmark 
is Industry? Remarks about the benchmark 
1 
Argus 
Research 1.46% No 
“We will generally rate a stock a buy if, in our view, the forecast risk-
adjusted return on the stock is greater than the forecast return on the market.” 
2 
Banc of 
America 1.74% No 
“The rating system is based on a stock's forward -12-month expected total 
return (price appreciation plus dividend yield).”  
3 Bear Stearns 2.11% Yes 
"Stock's expected performance vs. analyst's industry coverage for the next 12 
months." 
4 CIBC 1.52% Yes “Stock's expected performance vs. the sector for the next 12-18 months.”  
5 
Credit Suisse 
First Boston 3.64% Yes “Stock's expected total return vs. the industry for the next 12 months.” 
6 Deutsche Bank 2.04% No 
“Buy: total return expected to appreciate 10% or more over a 12-month 
period.” 
7 
Friedman 
Billing 1.51% Yes 
Performance “relative to similar companies within its industry over the next 
12-18 months.” 
8 
Goldman 
Sachs 4.12% Yes 
“Our ratings reflect expected stock price performance relative to each 
analyst's coverage universe.” 
9 
Jefferies and 
Co. 1.55% No 
“Buy: describes stocks that we expect to provide a total return of 15% or 
more within a 12-month period.”  
10 JP Morgan 3.05% Yes 
“Overweight: Over the next six to twelve months, we expect this stock will 
outperform the average total return of the stocks in the analyst’s (or the 
analyst’s team’s) coverage universe.”  
11 
Lehman 
Brothers 2.16% Yes “Stock's performance vs. the industry for a 12 month investment horizon” 
12 Merrill Lynch 4.45% No “Based on stock's expected total return within a 12 month period.”  
13 
Morgan 
Stanley 2.77% Yes 
“Stock's total return vs. analyst's coverage on a risk-adjusted basis, for the 
next 12-18 months.” 
14 
Raymond 
James 1.76% No Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
15 RBC 1.39% Yes 
“The rating assigned to a particular stock represents solely the analyst's view 
of how that stock will perform over the next 12 months relative to the 
analyst's sector” 
16 Sidoti 1.37% No "Buy implies at least 25% upside over a 12-month period." 
17 Smith Barney 3.34% Yes 
“Stock's performance vs. the analyst's industry coverage for the coming 12-18 
months.” 
18 UBS 3.48% No 
“The UBS rating system begins with the analyst determining the forecast 
stock return over the next 12 months. The forecast stock return relative to a 
predefined hurdle rate determines the Recommendation (Buy, Neutral, or 
Sell). This hurdle rate is set on either side of an unbiased estimate of the 
market’s return over the next 12 months.” 
19 
US Bancorp 
Piper Jaffray 1.96% No Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
20 Wachovia 1.73% No Performance “relative to the market over the next 12 months.” 
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Table 9 – Pseudo-Industry Recommendations 
This table reports tests on the monthly pseudo-industry recommendations during our sample period (9/2002-
12/2009).  We use three different ways to define pseudo-industry recommendations.  All Brokers defines monthly 
pseudo-industry recommendations as the value-weighted firm recommendations issued by all brokers in IBES 
within a month and an industry.  Industry Benchmarkers defines monthly pseudo-industry recommendations as the 
value-weighted firm recommendations issued by 10 brokers out of 20 largest brokers in the IBES which use the 
sector benchmark for firm recommendations. Market Benchmarkers defines monthly pseudo-industry 
recommendations as the value-weighted firm recommendations issued by 10 brokers out of 20 largest brokers in the 
IBES which use the market benchmark for firm recommendations. Panel A presents summary statistics of each type 
of pseudo-industry recommendations.  Panel B presents the correlation among the three pseudo-industry 
recommendations and the true industry recommendation.  Panel C shows the out-of-sample alphas of portfolios 
constructed based on each type of pseudo-industry recommendations.  The portfolios are constructed in a manner 
similar to those in table 5.  
Panel A – Summary Statistics 
 Pseudo-industry recommendation 
  N Average  STD 
All brokers  5598 1.6228 0.3316 
10 industry benchmarkers  4998 1.7146 0.4394 
10 industry market benchmarkers 5041 1.6179 0.4476 
Real-industry recommendation 4475 1.8541 0.4941 
 
Panel B – Correlation Matrix 
  
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (All 
brokers) 
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (Industry 
Benchmarkers) 
Pseudo Ind. 
Rec. (Market 
Benchmarkers) 
Real-industry 
Recs 
Pseudo Ind. Rec. (All brokers) 1    
Pseudo Ind. Rec.  
(Industry Benchmarkers) 0.5208 1   
Pseudo Ind. Rec.  
(Market Benchmarkers) 0.4880 0.1178 1  
Real Industry Recs 0.1584 0.1431 0.1053 1 
 
Panel C – Out-of-Sample Alphas 
Portfolio 
Pseudo Ind. Rec.  
(All brokers) 
Pseudo Ind. Rec. 
(Industry 
Benchmarkers) 
Pseudo Ind. Rec. 
(Market 
Benchmarkers) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1 0.0026 0.0021 0.0037 
p-value 0.1548 0.3183 0.0165 
    
2 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0024 
p-value 0.7479 0.4523 0.1634 
    
3 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0020 
p-value 0.9936 0.6933 0.7770 
     
Port 1 minus Port 3 0.0029 0.0029 0.0051 
p-value 0.6757 0.5919 0.4917 
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Table 10 – Out-of-Sample Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Firm Recommendations and Industry 
Recommendations 
This table presents the performance of portfolios sorted by both firm recommendations and industry consensus 
recommendations during our sample period (9/2002-12/2009). For each month t, firms are first sorted based on the 
consensus industry recommendation, and then are sorted based on stock recommendations (upgrades and 
downgrades). Industry recommendations portfolios are constructed as follows: for each month the consensus 
industry recommendation is defined as the average industry recommendation within the month. In each month we 
refer to the consensus recommendation for an industry as “optimistic” if this consensus is less than or equal 1.5. We 
refer to the consensus recommendation as “pessimistic” if it is greater than or equal to 2.5. In all other cases, we 
refer to the consensus as “neutral.” We then construct three industry portfolios for each month. Portfolio 1 in month 
t consists of all industries that were upgraded to “optimistic” during month t-1, Portfolio 3 consists of all industries 
that were downgraded to “pessimistic” during month t-1, and Portfolio 2 consists of all industries that were either 
upgraded or downgraded into the “neutral” consensus during month t-1.  Stock recommendations portfolios are 
constructed as follows: For each stock, we count the number of upgrades and number of downgrades that the stock 
received in month t-1. Portfolio U includes stocks with a larger number of upgrades than downgrades, while 
portfolio D includes stocks with more downgrades.  (1,U) refers to the portfolio which belongs to both industry 
recommendation portfolio 1 and firm recommendation portfolio U. (3,D) refers to the portfolio which belongs to 
both industry recommendation portfolio 3 and firm recommendation portfolio D. “(1,U) minus (3,D)” refers to the 
investment strategy of buying portfolio (1,U) and shorting portfolio (3,D). Out-of-sample tests are performed on the 
portfolio return in month t by using Fama-French four-factor model.  
 
  Firm Recommendation Portfolios 
Industry Recommendation Portfolios U (net upgraded) D (net downgraded) 
1 0.0144 0.0150 
p-value 0.0006 0.0052 
   
2 0.0050 -0.0006 
p-value 0.0617 0.8289 
   
3 -0.0065 -0.0169 
p-value 0.3330 0.0246 
    
Ind. Rec. Port 1 minus Ind. Rec. Port 3 0.0223 0.0284 
p-value 0.0113 0.0040 
   
(1,U) minus (3,D) 0.0330  
p-value 0.0007  
 
 
 
